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including, for example, Turing Pharmaceutical's 5500% increase in the price of pyrimethamine. Insufficient competition may be partly to blame, 2 as pharmaceutical companies can acquire these drugs and dramatically raise their prices, even though patent protections or other market exclusivities have expired. 3, 4 
OBJECTIVE
The aim of this study is to examine prices of off-patent drugs originally approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which exist in monopolies or duopolies, 5 and were acquired by a new company after 2000.
METHODS
We identified all brand-name drugs in tablet or capsule formulation approved by FDA since 1939. We focused on drugs in tablet or capsule formulation since inhaled drugs and many injectable drugs often use medical device technology subject to its own market exclusivity considerations, whereas infused drugs are predominantly purchased by hospitals and physician facilities. We excluded over-the-counter drugs, biologic therapies, nonmarketed drugs, reformulated drugs, and drugs with current patent protections or other market exclusivities. We then limited our sample to those brand-name drugs with 0 or 1 FDA-approved bioequivalent generic versions, as of April 2017. We specifically focused on monopolies and duopolies because the lack of competition makes products more susceptible to price increases. 2 For each brand-name drug, we determined whether its manufacturer had undergone a merger or acquisition or had transferred the drug license to another manufacturer (hereafter Bdrug acquisitions^or Bacquired drugs^), using a Bloomberg Terminal, company press releases, Security and Exchange Commission filings, and news sources. Next, we collected all available wholesale acquisition costs for each brand-name drug and, if one was available, its generic version, using a Bloomberg Terminal. Depending on whether drug prices were available ( Fig. 1) , we used Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests to compare prices before and after the most recent, post-2000 brand-name drug acquisition, as well as to compare the median brand-name and generic prices of both acquired and non-acquired drugs, using the most recent price available. Statistical analyses were performed using Stata 12.0 (StatCorp; College Station, TX) using a p value of 0.05.
RESULTS
Among 67 FDA-approved brand-name drugs with 0 or 1 currently marketed generics, 37 (55%) were acquired at least once since 2000, whereas 30 (45%) had not been acquired (Table 1) . Among acquired brand-name drugs with pre-and post-acquisition prices (n = 37), the median post-acquisition price was significantly higher than the median pre-acquisition price ($11. 
DISCUSSION
Among FDA-approved, off-patent brand-name drugs in tablet or capsule formulation and in monopolies or duopolies, more than half were acquired since 2000, with their median price more than doubling after acquisition. These findings suggest that Turing's acquisition of pyrimethamine was not an isolated event and companies may be targeting these drugs for acquisitions and subsequent price increases. Acquired drugs were priced more expensively than non-acquired drugs, though the differences were likely not statistically significant because of the relatively small number of drugs in monopolies or duopolies, which also limits the generalizability of our findings, as well as the inconsistent availability of pricing information.
Individual companies have drawn public ire for raising drug prices after acquisition, and in most cases, acquisitions do not lead to drug or delivery modifications, providing no additional value for patients or justification for price increases. Theoretically, the solution would be to cap price increases for offpatent drugs that have not undergone meaningful, clinically relevant improvements. In the meantime, the FDA's recent plan to accelerate generic drug approvals in markets with insufficient competition is encouraging, 6 but along with other federal agencies, it should also consider the impact of market concentration when approving mergers or acquisitions.
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